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Precisely forty years have passed since I began my career as a professional anthropologist. 
The achievement of this milestone has prompted me to reflect on what has happened to me 
and to anthropology over those four decades, from when I received my doctoral degree and 
took up my first teaching position, to today, now that I am taking my first steps towards 
retirement. What strikes me overall about these decades is that while I began with an 
anthropological orientation that was strongly inclined towards the natural sciences, I now 
find myself most closely aligned with the disciplines of art, architecture and design. And 
while my position has of course shifted over the years, it seems to me that the shift has 
been just as much on the sides of both the arts and the sciences. On the one hand, natural 
science is not where it was forty years ago – and here I am referring particularly to the fields 
of ecology and evolutionary biology with which I have been most closely associated in my 
work. But nor, on the other hand, are the arts where they were. Interpreted broadly to 
include architecture and design, it appears that the arts have shifted laterally to take up 
much of the field, and the position, from which science has abdicated. Or to put it in a 
nutshell, the people who are doing what I understood – forty years ago – to be science are 
now artists. What in the meantime has happened to science is an issue to which I will 
return. 
It is commonly supposed that anthropology is a centrifugal discipline that discharges its 
practitioners into fields as remote and far away as possible, in order that they may 
experience ways of life as different from their own as they could hope or expect to find. 
Many anthropologists would agree, flaunting their encounter with ‘radical alterity’ as a 
badge of honour. But for me, it has always felt the other way around. Ever since I embarked 
on my studies of the subject, anthropology has been about finding my way home. I had no 
settled point of origin from which to start. It was not as though, even before setting out, I 
already knew all there was to know about myself and what I was going to be. Like most 
apprentice anthropologists, I did go to a relatively distant place to undertake fieldwork, and 
in my case this involved a prolonged stay among Skolt Saami people in the far northeast of 
Finland. At the time, however, I had almost no idea of whom I was or where I came from, let 
alone of where I was going. I had a name and address, a passport, and next of kin to be 
contacted in case of emergency; I even had a degree from a respected university and a 
scholarship to support my work. But the voice with which I spoke, the hand with which I 
wrote, even the mind with which I thought – these were not yet me. They were but habits I 
had borrowed or styles that I had, at one time or another, sought or been trained to 
emulate.  
In that sojourn in Lapland, however, and through the moral education it gave me, I took my 
first, tentative steps homeward. The road has been long and tortuous. I have not arrived 
yet, and probably never will. But I am now more confident that it is indeed my voice that 
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speaks, my hand that writes and my mind that thinks. With voice, hand and mind I now 
declare: This is who I am. And who is this person whom I am slowly discovering myself to 
be? It seems to be a child. Raised in a happy household, where his mother indulged his 
passion for model railways while his father pursued scientific research into the mechanisms 
of spore dispersal of aquatic fungi, this child would spend long hours immersed in the pages 
of D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson’s monumental masterpiece, On Growth and Form, of which 
his father possessed a copy of the original 1917 edition, or investigating the mathematics of 
soap bubbles and the traces of spinning tops. He would go for walks in the countryside, 
paying absolutely no attention as his father would identify and reel off the Latin names of 
every plant and fungus we would come across – he knew them all! At school, guided by 
inspirational teachers, he sat at the edge of his seat in wonder at the mysteries of the 
universe as they were being unravelled by science. He experimented with cloud chambers 
and grew crystals in solution. It was obvious that he was going to be a mathematician and a 
scientist. 
What happened? A year of studying natural sciences at the University of Cambridge put paid 
my illusions. After the excitement of school science, lectures at Cambridge were an intense 
disappointment. I found much of what was taught intellectually claustrophobic, dedicated 
to the regimented and narrow-minded pursuit of objectives that seemed remote from 
experience. Unlike many of my fellow students, outraged by science’s renunciation of its 
democratic principles and its surrender to the megamachines of industrial and military 
power – this was, after all, a time when the war in Vietnam was at its height – I never 
became radically hostile to the scientific project. But I could see no future in it for myself. I 
wanted to study something in which there was room to grow, where I could discover the 
world and myself at the same time. And that was what led to anthropology. It appealed to 
me (rather as D’Arcy Thompson’s biology had done before) as a kind of pure mathematics of 
real life, where experience and imagination could come together as one. And so began my 
odyssey, my journey home. Proceeding on my way, far from drifting ever further from the 
truths I had absorbed in childhood, I found myself ever returning to them, and furthermore 
defending them, with all the force that I could muster, against the onslaught of adult 
disciplinary oppression. I have fought this campaign over the territories of biological and 
cultural evolution, human and animal environments, the realms of thinking and making, and 
the competing claims of art and science. 
 
II 
My father, as I mentioned, was a mycologist. His was a homely science, involving walks 
along river banks where he would collect the scum that often accumulates in brackish pools, 
bringing it home in glass phials to be investigated under a microscope set up on our dining 
room table. He had improvised an elaborate contraption involving a pile of volumes of the 
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Encyclopaedia Britannica, a glass plate, and an early version of the anglepoise lamp, which 
allowed him to project the forms of the fungi revealed under the microscope so that they 
could be accurately drawn. This he did with the utmost care, using a mapping pen, Indian 
ink and high quality Bristol board. Though he would never admit to it, this was his way of 
honouring the forms of nature, of not just contemplating their beauty but knowing them 
from the inside; and the results were true works of art. He loved his fungi. But perhaps what 
I did not realise at the time was that as a field of the botanical sciences, mycology is a deeply 
subversive discipline. Fungi, you see, just don’t behave as organisms should. We typically 
describe the organism as a blob-like entity with an inside and an outside, bounded by the 
skin, and interacting with the surrounding environment across the boundary. But fungi are 
not like that. They leak, they ooze, their boundaries are indefinable; they fill the air with 
their spores and infiltrate the ground with their meandering, ever-branching and ever-
extending fibres. What we see above ground are merely fruiting bodies, like street-lamps 
which cast their aerial illumination only thanks to hidden, subterranean circuitry.  
The mycologist Alan Rayner once remarked to me, in passing, that the whole of biology 
would be different had the mycelium – rather than, say, a mouse or a sea-urchin – been 
taken as a prototypical exemplar of the organism (Rayner 1977).1 Many years later, this 
thought would come back to haunt me, as I was developing a notion of what I called the 
‘mycelial person’ (Ingold 2003).2 What if we were to think of the person, like the fungal 
mycelium, not as a blob but as a bundle of lines, or relations, along which life is lived? What 
if our ecology was of lines rather than of blobs? What then can we mean by ‘environment’? 
People, after all, don’t live inside their bodies, as social theorists sometimes like to claim in 
their clichéd appeals to the notion of embodiment. Their trails are laid out in the ground, in 
footprints, paths and tracks, and their breaths mingle in the air (Ingold 2015). They stay alive 
only as long as there is a continual interchange of materials across ever-growing and ever-
shedding layers of skin. Thus, just as mycology subverts deeply held intuitions in the 
biological sciences, so – it now seems to me – anthropology does the same for the social 
sciences. Anthropologists, mycologists of the social, are the awkward squad, the jesters, the 
fools, who sidle up to power and chip away at its pretensions. And perhaps their 
awkwardness lies in precisely this: that they see a world of intricately enmeshed relations 
rather than one already divided into discrete and autonomous entities. 
We anthropologists are predisposed, therefore, to what could be called a relational rather 
than a populational way of thinking, to a view of the world more topological than statistical. 
And if anything, this has set us ever further apart from mainstream social science. Once 
again, this has its exact counterpart in bioscience. In the latter years of his life, my father 
used to rail against the way, in his view, biological science had lost touch with the reality of 
living organisms. He found much of the literature incomprehensible. It was produced by 
modellers who had never observed or handled anything that lived or grew upon this earth, 
and who spent their time in laboratories or in front of computers, analysing massive 
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datasets spewed out by machines from the stuff fed into them. In the spectacular and 
lavishly funded rise of e-social science we have seen much of the same. Fuelled by the 
digital revolution, it has become an immense data-processing exercise from which the 
people have effectively disappeared. In the social as in the biosciences, qualitative field-
based inquiries with living people or living organisms are increasingly regarded as naïve or 
amateurish. It is as though science had turned its back on the living, avoiding sentient 
involvement of any kind. In this brave new world, life is disposable, and its forms – whether 
human or non-human – are mere grist to the mill of data-analytics, the purpose of which is 
to produce results or ‘outputs’ whose value is to be judged by measures of impact or utility 
rather than by any appeal to truth. 
A datum is, by definition, that which is given. But what today’s scientists count as data have 
not been bestowed as any kind of gift or offering. To collect data, in science, is not to 
receive what is given but to extract what is not. Whether mined, washed up, deposited or 
precipitated, what is extracted comes in bits, already broken off from the currents of life, 
from their ebbs and flows, and from their mutual entailments. For the scientist even to 
admit to a relationship of give and take with the things in the world with which he deals 
would be enough to disqualify the inquiry and any insights arising from it. Ideally he should 
leave it all to his recording equipment and exit the scene, only to return to register the 
outcomes once the job is done and to transfer them to a databank or storage facility for safe 
keeping. That this is impossible in practice – especially in the field sciences for which the 
laboratory is nothing less than the world we live in, and from which there is no escape – is 
often considered a shortcoming, a weak point in the methodological armoury that could 
compromise the objectivity of the results. For what is methodology, if not a shield to protect 
the researcher from direct sensory contact with materials? The prescriptions of 
methodology treat the researcher’s own presence not as an essential prerequisite for 
learning from what the world has to offer us, but as a source of observer bias to be reduced 
at all cost. Any science that fails in this regard is considered to be methodologically ‘soft’, 
and anthropology by that measure – and mycology too, as my father used to practise it – is 
positively squishy.   
 
III 
Let us compare a hard object – say a ball – with a squishy one. The first, when it comes up 
against other things in the world, can have an impact. It can hit them, or even break them. 
In the hard sciences, every hit is a datum; if you accumulate enough data, you may achieve a 
breakthrough. The surface of the world has yielded under the impact of your incessant 
blows, and having done so, yields up some of its secrets. The squishy ball, by contrast, bends 
and deforms when it encounters other things, taking into itself some of their characteristics 
while they, in turn, bend to its pressure in accordance with their own inclinations and 
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dispositions. The ball responds to things as they respond to it. Or in a word, it enters with 
things into a relation of correspondence. In their practices of participant observation – of 
joining with the people among whom they work and learning from them – anthropologists 
become correspondents. They take into themselves something of their hosts’ ways of 
moving, feeling and thinking, their practical skills and modes of attention. So too, my father 
corresponded with the fungi as he drew their forms under the microscope. His hand, along 
with the pen it held, was drawn into their formative processes, and as he drew the forms re-
emerged on the surface of the board. Correspondence, whether with people or with other 
things, is a labour of love, of giving back what we owe to the human and non-human beings 
with which and with whom we share our world, for our own existence and formation.  
Two centuries ago, in Germany, Johan Wolfgang von Goethe proposed a method of science 
which demanded of practitioners that they should spend time with the objects of their 
attention, observe closely and with all their senses, draw what they observed, and 
endeavour to reach a level of mutual involvement or coupling, in perception and action, 
such that observer and observed become all but indistinguishable. It is from this crucible of 
mutual involvement, Goethe argued, that all knowledge grows.3 The parallels with the much 
more recent injunctions of participant observation in anthropology are striking: what we are 
exhorted to do with the people with whom we work – to spend time with them, join in their 
activities of daily life, observe closely and record – Goethe was already urging scientists to 
do with animals and plants, back in the eighteenth century. Yet contemporary attitudes to 
what is nowadays called ‘Goethean science’, in the technoscientific mainstream, are telling. 
It is commonly regarded with a degree of indifference bordering on contempt; its 
practitioners are ridiculed and its submissions for publication systematically rejected. It has 
not always been thus, however. Indeed I have a strong suspicion that the virulent 
repudiation of what we could call the science of correspondence coincides in a way that is 
not accidental with the colossal expansion, over the last four decades, of globalisation and 
the political economy of neoliberalism. These, of course, were the decades of my career as a 
professional anthropologist. What I have witnessed, over these decades, is the surrender of 
science to the forces of neoliberalism. And to find a counter-movement in the 
contemporary world, we have to turn not to science but to art.  
What might pejoratively be regarded as squishy science could, I think, be better and more 
positively described as the art of inquiry (Ingold 2013: 6-8). In this art, every work is an 
experiment: not in the natural scientific sense of testing a preconceived hypothesis or of 
engineering a confrontation between ideas ‘in the head’ and facts ‘on the ground’, but in 
the sense of prising an opening and following where it leads. You try things out and see 
what happens. Thus the art of inquiry moves forward in real time along with the lives of 
those who are touched by it, and with the world to which both it and they belong. Far from 
matching up to their plans and predictions, it joins with them in their hopes and dreams. 
This is the very opposite of methodology. It is not to wrap method up into an impregnable 
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shell, protecting the investigator from having to share in the suffering of those subjected to 
his hard-ball tactics, but rather to compare method to a way of working, akin to a craft, 
which opens up the world to our perception, to what is going on there, so that we in turn 
can answer to it. We could call it the method of hope:4 the hope that by paying attention to 
the beings and things with which we deal, they in turn will attend to us, and respond to our 
overtures. Anthropology, I believe, can be an art of inquiry in this sense. We need it not to 
accumulate more and more data about the world, but to better correspond with it.  
This, then, is where anthropology can join forces with art. But it is also to think of 
anthropology in a particular way which, I have to admit, is not the way in which most 
practising anthropologists currently think about their discipline. The majority of my 
colleagues would insist that the primary task of the anthropologist is ethnographic: that is, 
to give a richly detailed, accurate and nuanced account of life as it is lived for particular 
peoples in particular times and places.5 There is absolutely nothing wrong with this, of 
course, just as there is nothing wrong with a history of art that looks back on how artworks 
have been made and received, again in specific times and places. For ethnography as for the 
history of art, understanding is about putting things in context. Yet for all its manifest 
scholarly virtues, to put things in context is also to lay them to rest, to silence them or 
neutralise their power, so that the things themselves cease to engage our attention as 
active and ongoing forces in the world. They are, so to speak, accounted for, ticked off, put 
in their place. But people don’t act, nor do artists work, in order that their deeds and works 
may be accounted for by future historians. They act and work in order to make a difference 
in the world. Thus to create a work of art is to give birth to a new being, a being that will 
have its own life, alongside the lives of those who touch and are touched by it. The thing 
springs up, and like a rebellious child, refuses the efforts of its elders to put it to bed.  
I too, as I mentioned earlier, have become a child. And speaking as a child, I do wonder 
whether, as with art, anthropology should be in the business of understanding at all, or at 
least of understanding others. The child who cries out does not want to be understood. She 
wants to be, and to have the truth of her being acknowledged. She demands to be observed 
and listened to. Should we not attend? Or do we tell her – as the ethnographer tells the 
people or the historian tells the work of art – to get back into her proper context and be 
understood? Could it be that understanding actually blinds us to the truth of what is there? 
Anthropology, for me, is not about describing the world, or wrapping it up. It is, in the first 
place, about attending to presence, about noticing, and responding in kind. It means 
acknowledging that persons and other things are there, that they have their own being and 
their own lives to lead, and that it behoves us, for our own good, to pay attention to their 
existence and to what they are telling us. Only then can we learn. The same, I think, might 
be said for art. It too is an opening on the world rather than an attempt at closure – an 
opening that exposes the practitioner to its trials and to its gifts. That is why art combines 
well with anthropology but not with ethnography. For what art and anthropology open up, 
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ethnography – like art history – seeks to contain. But what, then, has happened to science? 
To answer this question we need to take a step back, and pick up the thread of my own 
anthropological travails from where I left off, having recently completed my doctoral 
fieldwork in Lapland. 
 
IV 
The year is 1974 and I have just spent twelve months at the University of Helsinki, in 
Finland, while writing up my field material. With my dissertation almost finished, I have 
recently landed my first proper job as a lecturer in social anthropology at the University of 
Manchester, where I am tasked with teaching a course that my predecessor Basil Sansom, 
whose position I had replaced, introduced a couple of years previously. The course was 
called Environment and Technology, and it was basically an introduction to the sub-field of 
cultural ecology, at that time almost unknown in the corridors of British social anthropology. 
For me, at least to begin with, it was a heavily science-based course. I wanted to show that 
any anthropology worthy of the name would have to be at least consistent with what we 
know from the biological sciences about the evolution and ecology of the human species. 
Accordingly, we read classical ecological studies such as Charles Elton’s Animal Ecology 
(1927), David Lack’s The Natural Regulation of Animal Numbers (1954), based on studies of 
the breeding patterns of birds, and the masterpiece by Vero Copner Wynne-Edwards, 
Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour (1962), in which he first proposed the idea 
of group selection.  
At that time there was much interest in how human populations, especially of hunters and 
gatherers, maintained their numbers in balance with the resources of the environment, and 
various social institutions and cultural practices were interpreted as functioning to that end. 
The idea was that in the long course of evolution, any population whose practices and 
institutions did not function to regulate numbers would have wiped itself out through 
resource depletion, leaving the field free for better regulated competitors. This did of course 
beg the question of why, if extant regulatory mechanisms worked so well, humans should 
ever have transitioned from their original hunting and gathering way of life to the much 
more laborious business of farming. Not that this deterred ecological anthropologists from 
applying the model of group selection to crop growers as well, and a classic of the genre was 
Roy Rappaport’s Pigs for the Ancestors (1968), a study of the relations between people, pigs 
and land in the Highlands of New Guinea. Drawing on models from animal ecology, 
Rappaport attempted to show that a complex of belief in ancestors, periodic warfare, and 
the raising and sacrifice of pigs served as a an adaptive mechanism for maintaining a 




For the students taking my course, Pigs for the Ancestors was required reading, along with 
much else published in its wake. My departmental colleagues, however, were suspicious. 
These, after all, were the days of the great sociobiology wars, and even to mention such 
topics as evolution, selection and population-resource balances was to risk accusations of 
genetic determinism or worse. The course was always considered to lie on the edge of the 
known continent of anthropology. Not for nothing was Environment and Technology 
abbreviated to ET, drawing mocking comparisons with Steven Spielberg’s celebrated Extra-
Terrestrial. However in 1975, in only the second year of my appointment at Manchester, the 
anthropologist Marshall Sahlins came to visit from Chicago. He was completing the book 
that eventually became Culture and Practical Reason (1976). Published in the following year, 
the book was an explicit critique of the so-called neofunctionalism that had taken hold in 
ecological anthropology. Following Rappaport’s example, the neofunctionalists were 
determined to show how every conceivable practice or institution served to maintain not 
just the society or culture of which it was a part, but the entire ecosystem. Without going 
into the details of the argument between Rappaport and Sahlins, it turned on the issue of 
whether natural systems have an intrinsic drive towards equilibrium or homeostasis, to 
which culture contributes as an adaptive mechanism, or whether the conditions of 
adaptation are themselves laid down by culture, understood as an autonomous system of 
symbolic representations that is constituted quite independently of natural conditions. 
Rappaport took the first view; Sahlins the second. With no compromise in sight, 
anthropology was apparently left condemned to oscillate between culture and practical 
reason – as Sahlins famously put it – like a prisoner between the walls of his cell.  
In the early 1980s, however, a possible solution arrived from another quarter. By that time, 
due to the departure of a colleague, I had come to assume responsibility for teaching 
economic as well as ecological anthropology, and the course title ET had morphed into EE: 
Environment and Economy. Suddenly, and for what turned out to be only a few years, 
French neo-Marxism became all the rage. Led by Maurice Godelier, the neo-Marxists led an 
all-out assault on what they snootily called the ‘vulgar materialism’ of so much work in 
cultural ecology. I too was swept up in the tide, and it became an important part of my 
teaching in EE. The question of the relation between economy and environment was 
mapped onto the classic Marxian problem of the interplay between social relations and 
technical forces of production. And for me – following Godelier6 – it became an inquiry into 
the dialectical interplay between two systems of relations, respectively social and ecological, 
the one dominant, in so far as it drove people’s productive activities, the other determinant 
in that it set limits on what the environment could sustain which, once exceeded, would 
trigger a transformation on the level of social relations of production, ushering in a new 
historical formation.  
In 1986 I put together a collection of essays, entitled The Appropriation of Nature, entirely 
devoted to the exploration of this interplay (Ingold 1986). I tried to show, for example, that 
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human hunting can be understood both socially as a productive activity, underwritten by 
relations of food sharing and the division of labour between men and women, and 
ecologically, as an interaction between human beings as natural predators and their non-
human prey. As a social being the hunter is a person, relating to other persons in society; as 
a predator he is an individual organism, relating to other organisms in nature. Models from 
evolutionary ecology and the study of animal behaviour might serve well enough to account 
for the interspecific dynamics of predator-prey interaction, and even for patterns of 
cooperation and communication among individuals of the same species which, like acrobats, 
can use each other’s bodies as mutually supportive elements to achieve results greater than 
what each could achieve individually. But on their own, I argued, these models are 
insufficient to comprehend the transformations of human history, which require some 
acknowledgement of the apparently unique power of human beings, up to a point, to shape 
their own destiny, to determine their productive purposes, and to bring about changes not 
only in their relations with their environment but also in those relations among themselves 
constitutive of society. Yet I was increasingly troubled by this splitting of the human into 
personal and organic components, partitioned respectively into the separate domains of 
society and nature, and in 1988 it all collapsed – a moment I vividly recall as a watershed 
when everything I had argued until then seemed irredeemably wrong. 
 
V 
Looking through old files I came across my introductory lecture for the course on 
Environment and Economy delivered on October 4th 1988. In it, I explained at great length 
about how we might describe relations on the one hand as social, between subject-persons, 
and on the other as ecological, between object-individuals, and how this underpinned both 
the difference and the complementarity between economic and ecological anthropology. 
The whole lecture was written out, in longhand, until page 16. Then I came across the 
following words: 
Ultimately, of course, the aim should be to transcend such dichotomies as economic 
versus ecological, social versus natural, person versus individual. Because human 
beings aren’t really made up of two semi-independent parts, as the Homo duplex 
model has it. That’s just a first approximation… 
And with those words the manuscript came to an abrupt end, followed by a blank. For by 
that time I already knew deep down that my introduction was going nowhere, and that 
there would be nothing for it but to start all over again. Everything would have to be 
rethought. For it had finally dawned on me that the model of the human being as one-part 
organism and one-part person was not even an approximation to the truth. It was simply 
untenable. Person and organism, I realised, were one and the same; the organism-in-its-
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environment is a being-in-the-world. And to follow this through would require a completely 
different kind of thinking, one that starts not from populations of individuals but from fields 
of relations.   
In social anthropology, as I noted earlier, this kind of relational thinking was already well 
established. Yet it was increasingly out of kilter with mainstream biology, which remained – 
and indeed still remains – firmly wedded to the population model. If I was to prove that 
person and organism are the same, I knew I would have to extend relational thinking to the 
biological domain as well, and that this would mean going against the grain of what 
biologists call the ‘modern synthesis’ in their discipline, a synthesis forged from the 
combination of Darwin’s theory of variation under natural selection with the mathematical 
theory of population genetics. In 1989, in a lecture presented to the Royal Anthropological 
Institute entitled ‘An anthropologist looks at biology’, I presented my first attempt along 
these lines (Ingold 1990). My aim was to restore the person to the continuum of organic life, 
not in the reductionist fashion of sociobiology, by putting it all down to genes, but by 
repositioning the organism as a locus of growth within a continuous field, and by thinking of 
evolution not statistically but topologically, as the unfolding of that field. Life, I insisted, is 
not in organisms; rather organisms are in life. Or in other words, living things are both 
generated and held in place within the ever-unfolding matrix of relations to which they 
contribute in their activity. This meant giving a central place to growth and development in 
the constitution of life-forms, and here my inspiration came from the work of D’Arcy 
Thompson, On Growth and Form, that had so inspired me as a child.7 I was, at last, coming 
full circle.  
Over the next decade, of the 1990s, I devoted myself to working out this way of thinking and 
exploring its implications. By that stage, my teaching for Environment and Economy had 
reached an impasse, and 1990-91 was the last year in which the course was taught, never to 
be revived again. In its place I developed two other courses, which I taught in alternate 
years. They were Culture, Perception and Cognition, and Anthropology of Art and 
Technology. In the first, I set my sights against the view, supported by an alliance between 
cognitive science and neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology – more recently popularised 
under the brand-name of evolutionary psychology – that culture is a kind of add-on, a 
supplementary programme acquired by a being that is biologically programmed from the 
start, and that as such, culture undergoes its own evolution in parallel with the evolution of 
the species. According to this view, to every human individual is transmitted one package of 
traits at the point of conception, coded in the genes, and another package on growing up, 
packaged in analogous particles of culture. Once again, it was the child in me that rebelled 
against what I saw as an adultocentric vision that casts the child as a creature of lesser 
worth by comparison to the more encultured adult, much as in an earlier era of 
anthropology, the primitive was ranked below the civilised. It is to view children in their 
‘early years’, like the ‘early man’ of textbooks in human evolution, as more biological in 
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proportion, as closer to their origins in nature, than the people of ‘later’ times who, in turn, 
have more of culture. And it is to put scientists, who can allegedly ‘see through’ culture to 
the reality of human nature, at the top. 
This cannot be right. The child is an organism through and through, no more, no less. But at 
no point, from cradle to grave, does this child either begin or cease to thread its life 
together with other lives, from which those patterns we call ‘culture’ are continually woven. 
And if this is true of particular lives, it must be true of human history as well. Just as there is 
no breakthrough from biology to culture in the life of the child, so there can be no 
breakthrough in the life of the species from evolution to history. We are all, and have always 
been, organism-persons (Ingold 2004). Why then did I find myself writing about these 
organism-persons not as bounded entities but as sites of binding, formed of knotted trails 
whose loose ends spread in all directions, tangling with other trails in other knots to form an 
ever-extending meshwork? It was, of course, because of what I had absorbed, as a child, 
from my father’s researches in mycology. As I have already shown, this description of the 
organism-person would serve just as well for the fungal mycelium. And for this reason I have 
come to question what we mean by ‘the environment’, and eventually to see it not as what 
surrounds – what is ‘out there’ rather than ‘in here’ – but as a zone of interpenetration in 
which our own and others’ lives are comprehensively entangled (Ingold 2006). This puts 
paid, once and for all, to the idea, still earnestly promulgated by many biologists and 
psychologists, that the child is a product of ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’, or of the interaction of 
genes and environment, in varying and often contested proportions. For children are not 
products, period. They are the producers of their lives with others, including grown-ups.  
And that, too, is why, in my course on Anthropology of Art and Technology, I sought to erase 
the dichotomy between the two terms by appealing to classical notions of ars (from Latin) 
and tekhnē (from Greek), both of which carried the primary connotation of skill. All 
knowledge, I argued, is founded in skill, in the improvisatory exploration of ways of doing 
things, under the watchful eye of more experienced hands. This is how children learn: not 
through having knowledge first socially transmitted to them, and then enacting in practice 
what they each have individually acquired, but by growing in knowledge, as they do in 
strength and stature, by following the same paths as their predecessors and under their 
direction. It is a process, if you will, of guided rediscovery, in which every generation stands 
to find out for itself much of what its forbears already knew, and possibly much else 
besides. Learning, as children know very well but as their teachers so often do not, is a 
creative process in which knowledge is not so much passed on as perpetually grown and 
regrown (Ingold 2007). And if people differ in what or how they know, it is not because they 
have inherited different ‘packages’ of transmitted representations, but because their lives 
have been entangled in environments, and in communities of practice, that differ in what 
they afford, in the kinds of attention they demand, and the responses that these demands 
call forth. Skill, in essence, inheres in the coordination of perception and action, attention 
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and response. What we are used to calling cultural variation, then, consists in the first place 
in variations of skill. And to account for this variation we have to attend not to the content 
of inherited tradition but to the dynamics of ontogenetic development.  
 
VI 
All that rethinking, with which I had been preoccupied throughout the 1990s, culminated in 
a volume of essays entitled The Perception of the Environment (Ingold 2000). Throughout 
these essays I tried to develop a new synthesis, alternative to the mainstream alliance of 
cognitive science and neo-Darwinism, which would draw together insights from 
developmental biology, ecological psychology and phenomenology, starting from the 
premise that the organism-person is not a bounded, self-contained entity, set over against 
the world, but a knot that is perpetually ravelling and unravelling within an unbounded 
matrix of relations. I was still adding finishing touches to the volume in the autumn of 1999 
when, after 25 years at the University of Manchester, I left to take up a new position at the 
University of Aberdeen, where I have remained ever since. And it was here that my 
pendulum finally swung to the pole of art. In fact the swing had already begin before I left 
Manchester, when I and a few others founded a seminar to explore the relations between 
art, architecture and anthropology. It was a rather remarkable seminar, distinguished by our 
practice of grounding discussions in practical activity, ranging from making string to 
repairing a dry-stone wall, and on moving to Aberdeen I was determined to follow it up. One 
way in which I did this was through teaching a new course on Anthropology, Archaeology 
Art and Architecture, known for short as ‘the 4As’. I taught the course intermittently from 
2004 to 2011, and finally converted it into a book, entitled Making (Ingold 2013). 
Once again, in this book, I found myself returning to childhood, this time in arguing against 
the notion of material culture, and against the idea that it is in what they do with objects 
that human beings make meaning for themselves. For me, there are no objects. Child as I 
am, I see a world in the making, not a world already made. Making things is not an 
imposition of form on matter, as though the end were already settled before the task 
began. For how can form precede the processes that give rise to it? How can a known and 
determined future precede the present and the past? In my childish eyes, not knowing what 
the future holds, making is a never-ending task of world-weaving, a correspondence of 
material movement and ambient vision. The model railway I built when I was young was 
never finished: it was always work in progress, just as real railways are, right up to the time 
it was abandoned when other things in life took over. Only occasionally, and not without 
hazard, did trains run on my line. The greatest pleasure came not from that but from placing 
my eye at the level of the layout and allowing my vision to enter into the little world I had 
created, to roam around the station buildings and on through the trees and meadows 
beside the tracks. The ground of my landscape was papier mâché laid on chicken wire, the 
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grass was cotton floss, and the trees were lichens I had collected from the woods. No 
objects here! Just an assemblage of materials whose pathways are as diverse as those we 
weave in in our quotidian lives as we read our newspapers, sew our clothes, feed the hens 
and wander in the forest.  
Whilst writing the first chapter of Making, in the spring of 2012, I was also preparing an 
application to the European Research Council for what was to become a major project. The 
chapter and the project both had the same title, ‘Knowing From the Inside’. And thanks to 
funding from the Council, that is where I am now, once more trying to understand what it 
means to pursue an art of inquiry from within the very world we seek to know, and in doing 
so, to draw anthropology into conversation with the disciplines of art, architecture and 
design.8 This is not, I should stress, to embark on an anthropological study of these 
disciplines or their practitioners. We have had quite enough of that! It is to study with them, 
or even by means of them. It is to think of the practice of art as a way of doing 
anthropology, a speculative exploration that would open up to possibilities of being and 
knowing that might otherwise go unheeded (Sansi 2015). It is to think of architecture as an 
anthropological exploration of the creative processes wherein people shape environments, 
and environments people. Its questions concern the generation of form, the energetics of 
force and flow, the properties of materials, the weave of surfaces, the atmospheres of 
volumes, and the dynamics of activity and of rest (Pallasmaa 1996, Spuybroek 2011, Bille 
and Sorensen 2016). And in the emerging field of ‘design anthropology’, it is to think of 
design as an aspect of a process of life whose primary characteristic is not that it is heading 
to a predetermined target but that it carries on. An anthropology by means of design is 
precisely this: about how anthropology, through experimental design practice, can help 
pave the way for sustainable futures (Gunn and Donovan 2012, Gunn, Otto and Charlotte 
Smith 2013).  
In all this I seem to have come a long way from exploring the mechanisms of regulation in 
populations of humans and non-human animals! But looking back, I’m not sure that I have 
shifted my position that much. After all, it was only because I failed in my attempts to hive 
off the social from the ecological, to place it beyond the bounds of nature, that I ended up 
returning knowing to where it belongs, on the inside of being, and returning being itself to 
the world (Ingold 1997). The pioneers of ecology whose work we read in the early days of 
my course on Environment and Technology would have considered it self-evident that we 
human beings are part of the ‘household of nature’ from which the field of ecology takes its 
name. They would be appalled – as my father latterly was – by the narrowly gene-centric 
perspective of contemporary bioscience, by its disregard for organic life, and by its 
obsession with data at the expense of a more holistic understanding of environmental 
relations and processes. And they would probably find themselves much in sympathy with 
contemporary environmental artists, architects and designers who are struggling to break 
down the boundaries between the human and the non-human, to foreground lived 
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experience, and to highlight the sheer richness and complexity of a world which human 
beings have irrevocably altered through their activities and yet in which they are puny by 
comparison to the forces they have unleashed. Welcome to the Anthropocene!9 Revisiting 
science and art: which is more ecological now? Why is art leading the way in promoting 
radical ecological awareness? The goals of today’s science are modelling, prediction and 
control. Is that why we turn to art to rediscover the humility that science has lost?  
 
VII 
I remember the science of my childhood, grounded in tacit wonder at the exquisite beauty 
of the natural world, in care, attentiveness, and in silent gratitude for what we owe the 
world for our existence. Much of today’s science, however, has turned wonder and 
gratitude into commodities. They no longer guide its practices but are rather invoked to 
advertise its results. Science has even enlisted art to promote its hard-sell, to offer images 
that beautify its results, soften its impact and mask its collusion with corporations whose 
only interest in research is that it should ‘drive innovation’. For in the neoliberal economy of 
knowledge, only what is new sells. True, much scientific research, in what is nowadays 
known as ‘academia’, lacks immediate application. It is said to be curiosity-driven, or ‘blue 
sky’. Scientists have been vociferous in defending their right to undertake blue-sky research. 
But in the land of academia, curiosity has been divorced from care, freedom from 
responsibility. Academia’s income comes from its exports of knowledge, but it is left to 
those who buy the knowledge to determine how it should be applied, whether to build 
bombs, cure disease, or rig markets. Why should scientists care? This attitude reveals the 
lofty appeal to blue skies to be little more than a self-serving defence of special interests 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of a global scientific elite which, in collusion with the 
corporations it serves, treats the rest of the world – including the vast majority of its 
increasingly impoverished and apparently disposable human population – as a standing 
reserve of data to feed the insatiable appetite of the knowledge economy.  
We should care, of course, because truth matters. And the responsible search for truth 
demands that care and curiosity go together. They are really two sides of the same coin. We 
are curious about the well-being of people we know and love, and never miss an 
opportunity to ask them how they are doing. That is because we care about them. Should it 
not be the same for the world around us? Is not curiosity a way of caring? Not, it must be 
said, according to the protocols of normal science which require, in the name of objectivity, 
that we sever all personal relations with the things we study, and remain unmoved and 
unperturbed by their condition. We owe them nothing, according to these protocols, and 
they offer us nothing in return. It is a great mistake, however, to equate the pursuit of 
objectivity with the pursuit of truth. For if the former prescribes that we cut all ties with the 
world, the latter demands our full and unqualified participation. I may be being childish or 
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naïve, but in my innocence I still believe in science as the pursuit not of innovation but of 
truth. And by truth I do not mean fact rather than fantasy, but the unison of experience and 
imagination in a world to which we are alive and that is alive to us. It is a truth that comes 
not after science, in its proud record of discoveries and achievements, but before science, in 
the more humble recognition that we are ourselves beholden, for our very existence, to the 
world we seek to know. Thus the movement from science to art, in my thinking and in my 
teaching, did not take me further away from science but further into it, into the very 
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NOTES 
1 Our conversation took place shortly before Rayner’s book was published. The 
extraordinary difficulties he experienced in finding a publisher for this volume says much 
about entrenched attitudes in biological science. 
2 I first presented this idea at the 96th Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological 
Association, Washington DC, November 1997, and in the following month at a conference 
on 'Nature Knowledge' hosted by the Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, Venice. 
More recently, the fields of mycology and anthropology have come together in the work of 
Anna Tsing (2015). 
3 Holdrege (2005) offers an excellent summary of the Goethean way of doing science.   
4 I have borrowed this expression from Miyasaki (2004).  
5 On the distinction between anthropology and ethnography, see Ingold (2011: 229-43; 
2013: 2-4; 2014).  
6 See Godelier (1978) for a useful summary of his position. 
7 An abridged edition of this work, with an introduction by John Tyler Bonner, is available as 
Thompson (1961). 
8 Much of the inspiration for this approach comes from science studies scholar Karen Barad. 
‘We do not obtain knowledge by standing outside of the world’, Barad writes; ’we know 
because “we” are of the world. We are part of the world in its differential becoming’ (Barad 
2007: 185).  
9 Much has been written on this controversial concept, and the roll-call of artists, architects 
and designers who are addressing its challenges would be far too long to list here. But to get 
a flavour of it, see the selection in Klingan et al. (2015).  
 
